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ABSTRACT 
Riley R. Graham 
 
 
Institutional Voting Trends & Activist Investors— Measuring Mutual Fund Voting 
Behavior in Proxy Fight Director Elections 
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Anil Shivdasani) 
 
 
I seek to identify which institutional investors are being the most proactive in 
terms of voting with or against activists and what factors influence mutual fund voting 
behavior using a dataset of activist campaign data and mutual fund vote records. 
Observing director election votes from Q3 2011 to Q2 2016, I conclude that some 
prominent fund families are siding with activists on a meaningful proportion of 
proposals. I also determine that variables like Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
recommendations and activists’ track records negatively affect opposition-sponsored 
director support, while stronger takeover defenses and prior year stock price return drive 
increases in the support of activists’ director nominees. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
When a retail investor with a small ownership stake in a public corporation does 
not agree with the decisions being made by that corporation’s management, he 
realistically has one option—sell his position in that corporation. Stock owners such as 
mutual funds (which represent a multitude of retail investors) and hedge funds with much 
larger positions in the same public companies, however, enjoy an expanded option set 
thanks to their significant ownership stakes. Shareholder activism is a mechanism by 
which the latter of these types of investors can influence management to make certain 
decisions or to prevent certain activities from taking place. Activism can be controversial 
because some believe that activist shareholders do not always act in the best interest of 
the company and all of its shareholders.  
 
Research Question5 
In the current state of the United States public equity market and its shift toward a 
greater number of passive investing strategies, mutual funds are among the largest 
holders of equity in U.S. corporations. Consequently, these institutional investors hold 
                                            
5 During my internship in the summer of 2017, I experienced shareholder activism in the context of a 
large public-to-public Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) acquisition. In the last three weeks of the 
summer, two large shareholders (holding roughly 3% and 4% of the acquiring REIT) launched public 
campaigns urging other shareholders to vote against the acquisition of the target REIT. These campaigns 
threatened the close of the acquisition. While I do not plan to further explore REIT activism professionally, 
knowing the scope of activist influence will help me understand the public market environment as I enter a 
career in real estate. Additionally, I hope my research will aid students and professionals alike in 
comprehending the effects of shareholder activism on passive investors. 
  2 
substantial voting power, which becomes increasingly relevant when activist investors 
force their issues to a vote in the form of a proxy fight. Due to SEC regulation, it is 
possible to see how mutual funds vote in these proxy fights. Said differently, we can 
observe how fund managers are choosing to vote on behalf of millions6 of retail clients in 
activist engagements.  
My research explores the behavior of these mutual fund investors in the activism 
context. The multifaceted question I address is: In an era of prolific activist investing, 
which institutional investors are being the most proactive in terms of voting with or 
against activists; further, what external factors influence these voting trends? 
 Two principal sources were cross-referenced to create a streamlined dataset to 
study this question between Q3 2011 to Q2 2016: a mutual fund vote history database 
(ISS Voting Analytics) and an activist engagement database (FactSet Shark Repellent).  
The compiled data was then streamlined to the most popular voting agenda item (director 
elections) and analyzed quantitatively. A quartile-weighted formula was then created to 
make conclusions about specific mutual fund families.  
 
  
                                            
6 Figure 1 (p. 4) shows statistics for mutual fund ownership in the U.S. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Simply put, we believe that requiring mutual fund managers to disclose 
their votes on corporate proxies would politicize proxy voting. In case 
after case, it would open mutual fund voting decisions to thinly veiled 
intimidation from activist groups whose agendas may have nothing to do 
with maximizing our clients' returns. 
 
— John J. Brennan & Edward C. Johnson III, Wall Street Journal, 2003 
 
In the above quotation from a 2003 Wall Street Journal article, CEOs Jack 
Brennan of Vanguard and Edward Johnson of Fidelity express their concerns about how 
legislation requiring mutual funds (MFs) to disclose their shareholder meeting votes 
exposes their corporations to value-ignorant activism. Broadly, the goal of activist 
investors is to purchase a significant number of shares in an undervalued public company 
and enact changes they believe will increase that company's share price (George and 
Lorsch, 2014). However, many consider activism tactics to be short-sighted and 
destructive to long-term value. This quotation demonstrates that prominent figures in the 
MF space identified their concerns about activism as soon as the SEC mandated voting 
disclosure. I hypothesize that certain qualities of activists and their target companies, 
such as the activist’s ownership stake and the company’s prior year stock performance, 
can influence how certain fund families vote in proxy contests.  
The prevailing conversations on activism and MF proxy voting are broad, and 
their implications are widely debated. Scholars have yet to explore the intersection of 
these two topics with any meaningful depth, so this crossroads is where I hope to 
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contribute to and expand on both conversations. In the following section, I discuss the 
evolution of MF proxy voting, the introduction of the SEC Form N-PX, the literature 
connecting MF voting to business ties, other potential vote-influencing factors, and the 
role of passive shareholders in the context of activism. 
 
Mutual Fund Proxy Voting 
It may seem logical that full disclosure is required for large MF companies, the 
firms that manage the savings of millions of Americans today. As of 2017, Vanguard's 
total global assets under management (AUM) exceeded the GDP of the United Kingdom 
by over $1.0 trillion (Vanguard, World Bank). Figure 1 below shows the evolution of 
U.S. household investment in mutual funds over selected non-continuous years. 
 
 
 
Figure 1  U.S. Household investment in mutual funds over selected years from 1980 to 2016. As of 2016, an 
estimated 94 million people (43.6% of households) held mutual fund interests, principally buying and selling 
through investment professionals, employer-sponsored retirement plans, and fund companies directly. 
Adapted from ICI Factbook, 2017. 
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For many large money managers, transparency is a relatively new concept. While 
the quotation from Brennan and Johnson indicates that voting disclosure hinders their 
ability to make discretionary, private decisions, the transparent structure appeals to value-
seeking shareholders. As recently as 14 years ago, institutional investors like BlackRock, 
Fidelity, and Vanguard were not required to register their votes on often-controversial 
matters such as corporate director elections or mergers and acquisitions (M&A). 
Nevertheless, these MF companies held and continue to hold the voting power of millions 
of shares vested in them by their clients (in this situation, retail investors like you and I 
"vote by proxy"). 
Investment managers have a fiduciary obligation to represent the best interests of 
their investors, which is significant because, as Figure 1 shows, a little less than half of 
US households owned MF interests in 2017. Further, US-registered investment 
companies own 31% of the US corporate equity market (ICI, 2017).  Most MF investors 
hope to simply track market trends via indices. These individuals are called passive 
investors. Once the SEC realized what was at stake with proxy voting, they decided to 
amend the Investment Company Act of 1940 (Rule 30b1-4) providing visibility to 
passive and active investors alike (SEC, 2013). Despite the fourteen-year existence of this 
legislation, its effects are not so obvious. Before I describe the ongoing conversations 
related to this legislation, I outline the specific mechanism that enables total transparency 
for investors: the SEC Form N-PX.  
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The SEC Form N-PX 
 The SEC's answer to MF disclosure concerns is the Form N-PX. Beginning in 
August 2004, proxy voting decisions for the prior 12-month period ending July 31st were 
required to be filed and available to the public via SEC EDGAR, the Commission’s 
company filing database (SEC, 2005). Form N-PX data is central to the research of 
scholars currently discussing the MF voting because it allows them to quantify each vote 
a fund casts at any given shareholder meeting.   
Ultimately, voting decisions became exposed to politicization. Once both 
institutional and retail investors could see how MFs were voting, the thought was that 
they would be held accountable for their decisions. Investors' best interests were 
paramount and transparency was routine, but questions about MF voting trends were left 
unanswered. The new rule made fund families more cautious about developing a pattern 
of consistently voting with management out of fear that their reputation among retail 
investors would be tarnished. Perhaps the more important development that accompanies 
voting disclosure, however, is that methodical voting raises questions about conflicts of 
interest and could expose fund families to litigation. 
The result of the Form N-PX’s emergence has been a literature mired in debate 
over the true actions of MF companies. Initial analysis of this rule's effects concludes 
there is "no evidence that mutual funds' support for management declined after the rule 
change" (Cremers and Romano, 2011, p. 220).  
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Voting and Business Ties 
The current conversation on MF voting focuses on business ties via pension plan 
management (whereby a fund manager is paid to manage a portion of a corporation's 
pension and receives a fee for doing so) and how such ties may influence voting 
decisions. Davis and Kim (2007) conclude, "Funds are no more likely to vote with 
management of client firms than of non-clients" (p. 552). The presence of multiple, 
conflicting incentives for MF voting outcomes obscures these funds' most likely voting 
behaviors. Because their dataset only includes the first year of mutual fund voting data, 
Davis and Kim cite caution caused by new legislation as a potential reason why conflicts 
of interest are not evident in their study. Their research—much like that of Matvos and 
Ostrovsky (2010) and Ashraf, Jayarman, and Ryan (2012)—controls for heterogeneity 
within fund families.7 In spite of this control, limitations like their restricted dataset and a 
small sample size led other scholars to explore this business tie connection further. 
Ashraf, Jayarman, and Ryan (2012) use a 2-year dataset from 2004 to 2006 and 
look strictly at proxy votes tied to executive compensation. Ashraf et al. point to studies 
that indicate fund families frequently adhere to shareholder advisory firm Institutional 
Shareholder Services (ISS) voting recommendations. For example, they reference the 
findings of Bethel and Gillan (2002) and Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009), noting, 
“Bethel and Gillan find that an unfavorable ISS recommendation is associated with 
13.6% to 20.6% fewer votes cast in favor of management. Similarly, [Cai et al.] report 
                                            
7 Fund family homogeneity is the widely observed (but not unanimously accepted) idea that all funds 
within a given fund family tend to vote the same on any one proxy vote. This differs from the heterogeneity 
explored by Matvos et al, which refers to differences in voting tendencies across fund families in the 
industry. 
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that in director elections, directors who receive a negative ISS recommendation obtain 
19% fewer votes” (p. 570). Based on these findings, they hypothesize that the influence 
of pension-related ties on mutual fund voting will be most apparent when ISS supports a 
proposal.  
The thought is that fund families do not want to risk estranging management of 
pension client corporations and will not follow ISS recommendations as frequently in this 
context. Ashraf, Jayarman, and Ryan (2012) conclude that a conflict of interest exists, 
stating fund families tend to vote against shareholder proposals most prevalently when 
ISS endorses the proposal. They notably add, "Nearly all funds within a fund family vote 
the same way on a given proposal” (p. 571), showing their support for the homogeneity 
argument. The scholars’ broader conclusion is that "pension-related business ties 
influence fund families to vote with management at all firms" (p. 568), not just client 
firms. More recent research suggests otherwise.  
Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) point to uncomprehensive datasets 
in prior studies and arrive at an antithetical result. Using an extensive collection of ISS 
MF data from 2003-2012, they observe, "Business ties significantly influence 
promanagement voting at the level of individual pairs of fund families and firms." These 
authors consider correlation versus causality, and their controlling measures are fairly 
exhaustive. 
 The other half of their equation is data on 401(K)-related business, which starts 
to provide structure for their hypothesis before any conclusions are made. Cvijanovic, 
Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) present Davis and Kim's (2007) observation that an 
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average of 14% and up to a staggering 25% of fund family revenue comes from 401(K)-
related business at these firms. Despite using some of the same data as Davis and Kim to 
corroborate their own argument, Cvijanovic et al. alternatively identify substantial 
influence from business ties when voting on portfolio firms.  
Their data points to an “increase in promanagement voting of over 12% for 
proposals that pass or fail by less than 20%” (Davis and Kim, 2007, p. 2935). This 
increase has grand implications for the activism conversation due to the fact that many 
activist proxy fights are highly contested. In fact, these scholars suggest that through 
votes in support of management, some MFs' business ties allow them to fend off potential 
activists. When I highlight a portion of the existing activism literature later on (see 
Activism and Passive Shareholders), the consequences of such ulterior motives will 
become evident. 
 
Other Potential External Factors 
Another body of literature focuses on external factors that influence voting 
behavior. The findings of Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016) tie to Matvos 
and Ostrovsky’s (2010) discovery that "some funds are systematically more 
management-friendly than others" (p. 91), and establish the presence of peer pressures 
that cause funds to vote against management when others are likely to do the same. Prior 
research by Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) introduces the idea that, even in a transaction 
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that destroys value for the acquirer, "cross-owners8 are significantly more likely to vote 
for the merger" (p. 397), because they can make up for their losses through the gains 
reaped by the target. This finding, like those of Cvijanovic et al. suggests that the 
shareholders' best interests may not be the key impetus for MF voting behavior.  
Another possibility specific to financial firms is that the natural self-governance 
in this sector leads to external considerations in the voting process, especially when 
cross-ownership exists. Keswani, Stolin, and Tran (2017) observe a conflict between 
institutional investors and investees wherein competitive influences can undermine their 
duty to vote for a value-increasing proposal. The conflict arises because public financial 
firms are largely held by other, private financial firms, creating an internal bias toward 
one’s own competitive interests in the voting process. Keswani et al. explain, “Both 
public and private financial firms vote on publicly held finance companies…Public 
companies themselves know how their investors voted, [but] this information is not 
available to outsiders, except for the aggregate voting outcome” (p.632). Although total 
transparency is impossible, one way to circumvent this obstacle is by observing MF 
companies voting on each other. Figure 2 shows how Keswani et al. examine private-to-
public voting. The solid lines in the figure represent visibility all investors have thanks to 
MF regulation. 
 
                                            
8 Cross-owners, in the context of mergers and acquisitions, are investors (usually institutional) who own 
stakes in both the target and acquirer. 
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Figure 2  Voting visibility in the mutual fund industry and the financial sector. Adapted from Keswani, Stolin, 
and Tran (2017, p. 632). 
 
Keswani et al. draw a conclusion about voting influence based on one specific 
environment, but their research broadly connects to that of Davis and Kim (2007) as well 
as Cvijanovic, Dasgupta, and Zachariadis (2016). Admittedly, their focus on conflict 
between a voter and a target within the “same product market” differs from other scholars 
in that their, “conflicted parties are entire organizations rather than their 
departments/divisions (Davis and Kim 2007, Ashraf et al. 2012, Cvijanovic et al. 2016)” 
(p. 633). As a result, the target in these votes can respond with actions more significant 
than the abandonment of a pension management contract.  
Keswani, Stolin, and Tran (2017) call for a policy change in the financial sector 
because of this heightened sensitivity to voting decisions. In order to avoid conflict, they 
suggest a return to voter confidentiality, which could, in turn, impact the presence of 
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activists. Accordingly, this research must be strongly considered in the context of voting 
on activist engagements.  
 
Activism and Passive Shareholders 
Mutual fund voting tendencies on activist-sponsored proposals are incredibly 
relevant because of the significant stakes funds hold in so many large corporations. By 
definition, all activist campaigns that reach a proxy vote contain shareholder-sponsored 
proposals. This fact does not bode well for activists given the conclusions discussed by 
scholars in the MF voting conversation, namely that MFs rarely vote against management 
(unless ISS recommends doing so). At present, virtually no literature exists observing MF 
voting in the context of activist engagements. One group of scholars broadly explores the 
relationships between passive shareholders and activist engagements.  
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016a) focus on quantifying the effect of passive 
investors on the success of activists. They observe, “Higher passive ownership is 
associated with greater success by activists in obtaining board representation, removing 
takeover defenses, and facilitating the sale of a targeted company,” but do not find any 
evidence to support that “passive ownership is related to activist efforts to affect policies, 
such as changes to payout policy or capital structure” (28). In this research, Appel et al. 
directly address the broad passive investor community and activists looking to find the 
most suitable environments for success. This research suggests that certain activities are 
more productive in the presence of passive investors, which is widely applicable 
knowledge for activists as well as shareholders of activist targets. 
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Another body of work by this group of authors follows the same general idea but 
more closely examines benefits enjoyed by corporations with high passive ownership. 
Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016b) explain that the prevalence of passive investors 
(usually mutual funds) roughly quadrupled between 1998 and 2014. The question the 
authors seek to answer is whether passive investors influence firm structures and 
performance. Appel et al. find that “ownership by passively managed funds is associated 
with more independent directors on a board, fewer takeover defenses, and more equal 
voting rights” (p. 39).  All of these characteristics are attractive to shareholders with 
concerns about concentration of power within management, but corporations that fit this 
description make prime targets for activists. A lack of takeover protections and fewer 
internal directors both catalyze the introduction of governance changes.  
Nevertheless, the main conclusion Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016b) reach is 
that the significant influence of passive investors leads to improvements in long-term 
performance. This relationship makes an even more concentrated focus on the mutual 
fund voting process necessary. 
Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016) similarly examine passive investors’ role in 
influencing corporate governance but reach more negative conclusions about this role 
than Appel, Gormley, and Keim (2016a). Schmidt and Fahlenbrach analyze 
announcement returns to board appointments and M&A, which they explain are costlier 
for passive institutions to monitor than the removal of poison pills, the establishment of 
equal voting rights, or an increase in board independence (factors observed by Appel et 
al. (2016a).  
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According to Schmidt and Fahlenbrach (2016), exogenous changes in passive 
ownership result in fewer independent director appointments and increased CEO power. 
These conclusions are supported by their observations of negative announcement returns 
post independent director announcement and underperforming M&A transactions. 
Accordingly, they assert that higher passive ownership negatively affects corporate 
governance and reduces shareholder value. 
It is important to mention that some scholars identify a link between high 
institutional ownership and activism. Carrothers (2017), asserts that hedge fund activists 
target firms with significant institutional ownership. Fos (2017) echoes this sentiment, 
adding that high institutional ownership, “indicates a more sophisticated shareholder 
base, whose support dissident shareholders often need to succeed with a proxy contest” 
(p. 664). While Carrothers concludes that a mutually beneficial relationship exists 
between activists and institutional investors, Fos points out that many activists would not 
have their demands met without the endorsement of passive investors. If true, this 
relationship is far from mutually beneficial.  
 
Summary 
From the existing research on mutual fund voting and activism, I observe that 
there is a significant literature that looks at outcomes from passive ownership. Although I 
spend time discussing the conclusions of many of these authors, my goal is to analyze 
and be able to aid in predicting MF voting behavior. Research overwhelmingly suggests 
that MFs tend to vote with management—this much is clear from the work in the 
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environment that scholars have explored thus far. However, activist engagements 
introduce an entirely new variable: how do MFs respond to activists or management 
when able to vote their massive stakes in contentious proxy fights.  
The existing literature leaves a host of questions unanswered. In my research, I 
contextualize votes further than the simple delineation of pro- or against management. 
With my analysis, I hope to fill the void in the existing conversations by answering the 
following question (stated again): In an era of prolific shareholder activism, which 
institutional investors are being the most proactive in terms of voting with or against 
activists; further, what external factors influence these voting trends? 
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METHODOLOGY 
  
In this section of my thesis, I explain the various methods used to collect and 
analyze the data needed to answer my research question. I begin by describing the 
databases I used and how I sorted the data. Next, I discuss the various limiting criteria I 
used to streamline the data to a sample that is relevant and manageable in size while also 
as exhaustive as possible. I then detail the steps involved in analyzing each voting 
decision from the institutional investor's perspective. To conclude, I describe my means 
of determining various levels of proactivity by each institutional investor. At this point, I 
also describe how I monitored various external factors throughout the data analysis. 
Because many distributors market their funds under various brand names, one 
distributor may have, for example, over 30 separately-marketed funds. For the purposes 
of clarification, I henceforth refer to mutual fund distributors like BlackRock and 
Vanguard as fund families and their individually-marketed mutual funds simply as funds. 
I borrow this distinction from earlier research on mutual funds by Davis and Kim (2007). 
I obtain data from FactSet (including SharkRepellent), the Investment Company 
Institute, and ISS Mutual Fund Voting Records. 
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SharkWatch 
The starting point of my sample is data I collect on the activist engagements 
during my selected time period. FactSet’s SharkRepellent tool features a database of 
activist campaigns complete with over 25 descriptive characteristics related to the target 
and activist engagement. Using the database’s SharkWatch tool, I amass a list of all 
campaign that resulted in a proxy fight. My sampling criteria are explained in detail in the 
next section.  
 
Sampling Criteria 
My corporate sampling frame in SharkWatch consists of companies with market 
capitalizations greater than $1 billion, located in the United States, with activist 
engagements between Q3 2011 and Q2 2016. This date range is practical because it 
allows me to identify trends from the most recent voting dating I could obtain while 
maintaining a reasonably wide time range—five years. If I had chosen to examine a more 
expansive date range, I would have risked identifying stale trends that may be irrelevant 
looking forward.  I employ the $1bn size parameter in order to avoid engagements where 
inexperienced activists made demands in small corporations. Finally, I limit the 
corporation's location to the United States because I want to ensure fund voting data is 
available for each proxy vote.  
SharkRepellent defines a proxy fight as a “campaign under which a stockholder or 
group of stockholders (the "dissident") solicits the proxy or written consent of fellow 
stockholders in support of a resolution it is advancing” (SharkRepellent). It further breaks 
  18 
down the results of these fights into those that “went the distance” (reached a vote) and 
those that “went definitive” (dissident filed a proxy statement, but the fight was settled or 
proxy was withdrawn). Although shareholder activism does not always result in proxy 
fights, I can only examine fights that “went the distance” because voting is the only way 
to objectively quantify a fund’s response to the issue.  The following tables detail the 
longevity of all proxy fights (providing outcomes for those that went the distance) 
between 2011 and 2016 (Table 1) and selected characteristics of each campaign (Table 
2). 
 
Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
Summary of Proxy Fights — 2011 to 2016
Outcome 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Mean
Settled 45.2% 54.5% 46.7% 45.7% 40.0% 38.5% 45.1%
Withdrawn 25.8% 28.6% 26.7% 14.1% 26.7% 19.3% 23.5%
Went the Distance 26.9% 36.4% 33.3% 34.8% 29.5% 34.9% 32.6%
Winner if "Went the Distance"
Management 56.0% 53.6% 40.0% 37.5% 51.6% 73.7% 52.1%
Dissident 32.0% 32.1% 56.7% 56.3% 45.2% 23.7% 41.0%
Split 12.0% 14.3% 3.3% 6.3% 3.2% 2.6% 7.0%
  19 
Table 2 
 
 
 
ISS Mutual Fund Vote Records 
Once the data on activist engagements that resulted in a proxy vote is gathered, I 
then identify which funds were voting-eligible investors in each corporation when a 
proxy vote occurred. At this point, I progress to the ISS Mutual Fund Vote Records 
database. The database compiles voting records from SEC N-PX filings.  
Campaign Sample Overview
Director & Meeting Prior Year
Company Name Ticker Dissident Group1 Officer Own.2 Industry Date  Return3
Forest Laboratories, Inc. FRX Icahn 2.6% Pharmaceuticals: Major Aug-11 45.2%
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. CBRL Biglari 5.0% Restaurants Dec-11 (8.3%)
Oshkosh Corporation OSK Icahn 3.3% Motor Vehicles Jan-12 (18.4%)
AOL Inc. AOL Starboard Value 5.0% Information Technology Services Jun-12 (47.0%)
Forest Laboratories, Inc. FRX Icahn 2.4% Pharmaceuticals: Major Aug-12 (5.8%)
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. CBRL Biglari 2.9% Restaurants Nov-12 16.7%
International Game Technology IGT SpringOwl 0.8% Computer Processing Hardware Mar-13 53.0%
Stillwater Mining Company SWC Clinton Group 1.7% Other Metals/Minerals May-13 13.8%
Alere, Inc. ALR Coppersmith, Scopia 8.9% Pharmaceuticals: Other Aug-13 12.7%
Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. CBRL Biglari 0.0% Restaurants Nov-13 23.1%
Sensient Technologies Corporation SXT FrontFour Capital Group 2.0% Food: Specialty/Candy Apr-14 29.9%
Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. TDS GAMCO Asset Mgmt. 10.0% Wireless Telecommunications May-14 22.3%
Cliffs Natural Resources Inc. CLF Casablanca 1.0% Steel Jul-14 (42.8%)
Bob Evans Farms, Inc. BOBE Sandell Asset Mgmt. 4.1% Restaurants Aug-14 37.3%
CONMED Corporation CNMD Voce 8.0% Medical Specialties Sep-14 33.2%
Darden Restaurants, Inc. DRI Starboard Value 3.0% Restaurants Oct-14 (2.1%)
E. I. du Pont de Nemours and Company DD Trian Fund Mgmt. 1.0% Chemicals: Specialty May-15 18.3%
Rovi Corporation ROVI Engaged 2.0% Internet Software/Services May-15 (9.5%)
Telephone and Data Systems, Inc. TDS GAMCO Asset Mgmt. 11.2% Specialty Telecommunications May-15 5.8%
Shutterfly, Inc. SFLY Marathon Partners 1.3% Miscellaneous Commercial Services Jun-15 (24.0%)
Benchmark Electronics, Inc. BHE Engaged Capital 2.5% Electronic Components May-16 (5.2%)
21 Unique Activist Engagements Director/Officer Own. Avg. 3.7% Average Prior Year Return 7.1%
Notes:
1. Dissident Group names are abbreviated. See Appendix for table with detailed campaign information, including full Dissident Group names
2. Director & Officer Own. consists of total stock ownership held by internal and external directors, and the corporation's officers
3. Prior Year Stock Return is calculated as target corporation's stock price return, excluding dividends, for 1 year leading up to the unaffected stock
price date (1 week before FactSet "Action Date")
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Amassing mutual fund vote records is the most crucial component of my data 
collection. Per the SEC website, “Not later than August 31st of each year, a mutual fund 
must file…the fund’s complete proxy voting record for the most recent 12-month period 
ended June 30th.”9 Each fund’s voting disclosures are reported on a separate N-PX form 
for the most part (there are a few exceptions). The ISS MF voting database, however, 
aggregates all individual fund votes into a single fund family portfolio.  
In order to collect the votes relevant to my sample’s activist engagements, I input 
various search criteria in the following three-step process: 
Table 3 
 
Step Description 
Step 1 Enter five-year date range, Q3 2011—7/1/2011 to 6/30/2016 
Step 2 Identify companies I need N-PX data for; using the output of my initial SharkWatch proxy 
fight screen, I provide the tickers of each corporation 
Step 3 Specify desired query variables; there are 21 options detailing institution, company, 
meeting, agenda, and vote results information, all of which I include for context 
  
 
It is worth noting that there are inevitably some campaigns that fit my sampling criteria 
but whose voting results do not appear in my cross-compiled dataset. Because select 
activist engagements were brought on by individuals for board representation, or due to 
other factors, not all campaigns from the initial SharkWatch results have corresponding 
voting data. Conversely, some campaigns lacked corresponding independent variable 
data from SharkRepellent. This was true for four activist engagements, which does not 
adversely affect the integrity of my sample.  
                                            
9 https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsmfproxyvotinghtm.html 
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Director Elections and Vote Counting 
Because the large majority of proposals in my dataset were board of director 
nominee proposals, I focus my research on director election votes. This decision allows 
for a dataset containing a uniform proposal type while analyzing the large majority of the 
raw voting result sample. Narrowing the votes to director elections eliminates only 30% 
of the roughly 86,000 initial fund-level observations. 
The labeling of director nominees as management or opposition candidates is a 
critical issue for my research. In the raw voting data, director elections are classified as 
“Elect Director (Management)” or “Elect Director (Opposition Slate).” A high number of 
nominees on the opposition slate are in fact management nominees. This categorical 
misnomer exists because of how proxy votes are structured.  
Opposition slates (where activists present their director nominees) contain as 
many nominees as there are seats available. In most cases, activists do not recommend a 
nominee to replace or fill all board seats up for election. Thus, opposition slates almost 
always contain a mix of true opposition nominees and management’s nominees.10 The 
delineation between management nominees on the opposition slate and unique directors 
that shareholders (activists) recommend is essential because identifying the correct 
opposition-sponsored proposals is central to my data analysis.  
The SEC provides a helpful explanation for how fund families and other 
shareholders can vote in proxy fights, and voter’s options depend on the type of director 
                                            
10 I am able to identify exactly which directors on the opposition slate are truly opposition nominees 
because management nominees on the opposition slate are marked as such 
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election that the corporation holds. Company bylaws typically determine the standard; the 
two options are “plurality vote” and “majority vote.” From the SEC: 
A "plurality vote" means that the winning candidate only needs to get more votes 
than a competing candidate. If a director runs unopposed, he or she only needs 
one vote to be elected, so an "against" vote is meaningless. Because of this, 
shareholders have the option to express dissatisfaction with a candidate by 
indicating that they wish to "withhold" authority to vote their shares in favor of 
the candidate. A substantial number of "withhold" votes will not prevent a 
candidate from getting elected, but it can sometimes influence future decisions by 
the board of directors concerning director nominees. 
A "majority vote" means that directors are elected only if they receive a 
majority of the shares voting or present at the meeting. In this case, you have the 
choice of voting "for" each nominee, "against" each nominee, or you can 
"abstain" from voting your shares. An "abstain" vote may or may not affect a 
director's election. Each company must disclose how "abstain" or "withhold" 
votes affect an election in its proxy statement (SEC, 2012). 
 
Based on the above definitions, “withhold” votes are counted as votes against the 
proposal in question for my sample. Such votes represent roughly 10% of director 
election votes in the sample.  
 In order to control for larger fund families that have a greater number of funds 
voting on each proposal within a proxy fight, the sample counts only one vote per fund 
family per proposal. I use a mnemonic in Excel that combines agenda item description 
and date to narrow the dataset to unique proposals.  
For instances where there is not complete fund family homogeneity, any “for” 
vote cast takes precedent and is used for further analysis. For example, if Fidelity has 5 
funds that vote “for” and 1 fund that votes “against” a proposal, Fidelity family-level vote 
counted for that proposal is “for.” This decision stems from the thought that if the 
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proposal is compelling enough for the family to support it with even one fund, that should 
be sufficient.  
Admittedly, a more advanced analysis would not use this simplistic of an 
approach. However, in the majority of the examples of heterogeneity in this sample, votes 
against were in the minority at the individual fund level in instances where a family voted 
in favor with at least one fund. Of the final unique vote tally, fewer than 3% of 
observations showed family heterogeneity. 
I also exclude “do not vote” observations from the dataset. External factors may 
influence the decision not to vote—which is different than withholding a vote—but my 
analysis focuses on instances where votes were cast. This decision is sufficient for 
comparing management-sponsored director proposals to oppositions-sponsored (activist) 
proposals. 
The main independent variable I study in my analysis is fund families’ 
opposition-sponsored director support percentage. When an opposition slate is chosen by 
the fund family, the opposition support metric is calculated as: 
 #	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑖𝑛	𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒𝑠	𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙	𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟	𝑜𝑓	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑜𝑛	𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑛𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑒	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑠(𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑖𝑛	𝑓𝑎𝑣𝑜𝑟	 + 	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡	𝑎𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡)  
 
This method does not penalize mutual fund voters for not choosing management slates in 
favor of opposition slates, rather, it compares the number of votes cast in favor of the 
opposition-sponsored directors to those cast against or withheld. This calculation 
provides an accurate picture of each fund family’s voting tendencies because it measures 
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how they voted when presented with each individual director nominee on the slate they 
choose.11 
 It is imperative to reiterate and clarify that I calculate my proposal support 
percentages at the fund family level. As a result, each fund family’s opposition-sponsored 
director support percentage is given equal weight in my regression analyses despite the 
wide range of number of proposals voted on by each family. I chose this method because 
my goal is to identify which fund families are most supportive of activist proposals and 
which are not (later discussed as activist “friends” and “foes”). Another option would 
have been to observe how each of the variables I study influence voting at the individual 
proposal level, but again, my research focuses on fund family voting behavior.  
 
Investment Company Institute 
 I use data from the Investment Company Institute to rank U.S. fund families by 
their assets under management (AUM).12 My initial sample of fund families is narrowed 
from all votes in the date range to only those cast by families that fall under the top 75 
managers by AUM. After this filter is applied, 42 “top-75” families remain. My first 
regression analysis considers 34 of these fund families, and the second regression used a 
narrowed sample containing only top 35 managers by AUM, which leaves 23 families to 
analyze.  
                                            
11 See Opportunities for Further Exploration section for other potential opposition support analysis 
methodologies 
12 AUM ranking data are as of June 30, 2016, consistent with the end date cutoff of the sample;  
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I focus the latter part of my analysis on the 35 largest fund families by AUM 
because my research is meant to investigate large institutional investors and their 
tendencies in recent history. This filtering concentrates my results on fund families with 
the largest presence in public equity markets. My sample does not contain all 35 fund 
families because not all 35 families own stock in or voted in at least one of the studied 
activist engagements. 13  
Table 4 below presents selected summary statistics for the initial “top-75” sample, 
counting votes cast by each fund (one per unique ballot item) as well as descriptive data 
points from the 21 proxy fights observed. This initial summary statistics table considers 
one vote per fund family on the 350 unique director proposals (despite families with >1 
fund invested in a corporation having cast a vote for each fund).14  
 
Table 4 
 
                                            
13 Another reason that the top 75 mutual fund families by AUM became 42 observable families is because 
not all of these families cast votes for opposition directors in the sample’s proxy fights. For example, 
PIMCO, the 9th largest mutual fund investor by US AUM, did not cast any votes for opposition directors, 
so I cannot calculate an opposition-support percentage or a proposal-driven affirmative vote bias figure for 
this fund family. Additionally, I removed from the analysis fund families that voted on 5 or fewer 
opposition proposals  
14 This practice avoids double counting, though the total number of actual vote observations in the dataset 
was over 50,000. I display the unique vote figure here because they comprise the tallies used for trend 
analysis later on. 
Summary Statistics — Entire Sample
Total Observations (one vote per fund family) 4,275
Votes "For" + "Against" 3,858
Votes "Withheld" 417
Total Director Nominees 350
Management-sponsored Director Nominees 264
Opposition-sponsored Director Nominees 86
Fund Families (top 75 by AUM) 42
Years 5
Fiscal Quarters 20
Unique Corporations (activism targets) 17
Proxy Fights 21
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Fund Vote Analysis Metrics 
 The goal of this research is to determine which fund families are the most 
proactive in the arena of proxy fight voting. To this end, I consider several questions: 
• Principally, which institutional investors tend to vote in line with activists? 
• Conversely, which investors tend to vote against activists?  
• Lastly, does voting depend on the performance of the activist or some 
characteristic of the corporation?  
Using my combined dataset as a base, I consider a mix of proportion statistics and other 
variables made available by the SharkWatch database to analyze fund voting trends. The 
measures I choose to analyze are:  
1. Management-opposition support differential 
2. ISS recommendation 
3. Activism target’s market capitalization 
4. Dissident ownership in target 
5. Director/officer ownership 
6. Dissident is in SharkWatch 50, and  
7. Target's Bullet Proof Rating 
Each of these quantitative and qualitative variables is incorporated in at least one of the 
metrics used in my analysis, which I describe in detail to follow.  
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Proposal-Driven Affirmative Vote Bias 
First, I view the director voting results data from a high-level perspective and 
calculate each fund family’s proportion of votes in support of (and against) management 
nominees and opposition nominees independently. From these figures, I can begin to get 
an idea of how various families vote depending on which party—management or 
opposition—nominates the director. I compute a simple differential that shows the 
increased likelihood, if any, that a family supports a management director nominee over 
an opposition nominee.  
A positive differential indicates that the fund family is more likely to vote “for” 
management director nominees, while a zero value suggests they are indifferent to the 
nominee’s source. I also compute the percentage difference between these proportions, 
which I deem the proposal-driven affirmative vote bias. These values are calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙:	%	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	for (𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − %	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑓𝑜𝑟	(𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)  
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙 − 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛	𝐴𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒	𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠:	%	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑓𝑜𝑟	(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)%	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑓𝑜𝑟	(𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) − 1 
 
Proposal-Driven ISS Adherence Bias 
 In addition to being a provider of mutual fund voting data, ISS issues voting 
recommendations for institutional and other shareholders in proxy fights. These 
recommendations for individual director proposals accompany the voting data used in my 
study. Most, if not all, institutional voters consider ISS’s guidance at varying degrees 
before voting.  
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I use the ISS recommendation for three metrics: 1) a differential of fund families’ 
proportion of votes with ISS in both director source scenarios, 2) a percentage difference 
between the two proportions, similar to the proposal-driven affirmative vote bias, and 3) 
a percentage of supportive ISS recommendations relative to all director proposals voted 
on.15 The differential and bias metrics are computed as: 
 𝐼𝑆𝑆	𝐴𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙:%	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐼𝑆𝑆	(𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)− %	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐼𝑆𝑆	(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙 − 𝐷𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛	𝐼𝑆𝑆	𝐴𝑑ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝐵𝑖𝑎𝑠:	 %	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐼𝑆𝑆	(𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛)%	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠	𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ	𝐼𝑆𝑆	(𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) − 1 
 
The ISS Adherence Differential metric allows me to measure how a given fund family 
considers the ISS recommendation for management-sponsored director nominees versus 
opposition-sponsored candidates. The Proposal-Driven ISS Adherence Bias will quantify 
that bias if any exists, and the percentage of supportive ISS recommendations will be 
tested as a variable in multivariate regressions to determine if a relationship exists 
between opposition voting support and ISS support for director nominees.  
 
Average Market Capitalization 
I also consider the market capitalization of activism targets in my analysis. 
Measuring a corporation’s size is one way to observe if factors seemingly unrelated to the 
director being nominated influence a fund family’s voting decision. I match the 
                                            
15 It is worth noting that ISS recommended “do not vote” on almost 40% of director proposals in the 
sample. For the purposes of my analysis, only ISS recommendations to vote “for” are considered 
supportive.  
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applicable market capitalizations with director proposals using a custom date+ticker 
mnemonic in my master Excel file and subsequently find the average value for each fund 
family. While a company’s size is a helpful contextual element for analysis, I do not 
expect size to be a meaningful driver of voting behavior in either direction. 
 
Average Dissident Ownership 
 Another metric I measure is dissident ownership in the target corporation for each 
corresponding director proposal. For each fund family, I compute the average dissident 
ownership for all proposals they voted on. This is one of the many qualitative 
characteristics SharkRepellent provides for each activist campaign, and I use my 
date+ticker mechanism to match these values to each proposal.  
Knowing how much of the target corporation the activist owns is relevant because 
higher ownership could indicate a more significant vested interest in the proposal’s 
outcome. I hypothesize that higher dissident ownership percentages lead to increased 
opposition support, and I closely observe the result of this variable in my regressions. 
 
Average Director & Officer Ownership 
 Again, using the date+ticker matching mnemonic, I also calculate at the fund 
family level the average director and officer company ownership percentage tied to the 
director nominees voted on. Another data point from the SharkRepellent dataset, this 
metric may be significant for reasons similar to those of dissident ownership. If 
executives or directors within a company hold a meaningful portion of that company’s 
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stock, that factor may influence support of management nominees. For the same reason 
as the dissident ownership percentage variable, I expect that the average director and 
officer ownership variable will bear a positive coefficient. 
 
SharkRepellent Proprietary Metrics  
The final two characteristics I consider at the campaign level—and again match to 
relevant proposals—are whether the activist is a member of the SharkWatch 50 and the 
target corporation’s Bullet Proof Rating. These are both proprietary SharkRepellent 
metrics. 
 
Dissident in SharkWatch 50 
The SharkWatch50 (henceforth SW50) is a compilation of 50 significant activist 
investors. SharkRepellent selects members of this group according to the certain criteria 
including but not limited to the following (in order of importance):  
• Number of activist campaigns waged, with an emphasis on recent activity  
• Size of targeted companies  
• Severity of tactics employed (e.g., contentious 13D Item. 4s vs. full-fledged proxy 
fights and unsolicited/hostile acquisition offers)  
• Success rate (ability to affect change at targeted companies) (Shark Repellent) 
The SW50 is reevaluated as needed, and the database monitors activism daily. Similar to 
other metrics in my study, I calculate an average percentage of director proposals tied to 
campaigns with an SW50 member for each fund family. 
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Bullet Proof Rating 
 SharkRepellent’s Bullet Proof Rating is an index system that measures a 
corporation’s defense mechanisms in a takeover defense scenario. Though I am 
exclusively observing director elections in my study, this rating may serve as a measure 
of how targets respond to activists in general. According to the database: 
“The rating includes only proactive defenses, and as such does not take into 
consideration ownership and voting rights, the takeover laws which govern the 
state in which a company is incorporated, nor whether a company has opted out of 
coverage of applicable state takeover laws. The rating scale is from 0 to 10, with a 
10 representing the most formidable defenses. The Bullet Proof Rating is a 
relative measurement and is not intended to measure the probability of a 
successful defense” (SharkRepellent).  
 
With this metric, I compute an average Bullet Proof Rating of the campaign targets 
corresponding to votes on director nominees for each fund family. 
 
Prior Year Stock Price Return 
 In order to check for influence due to poor or strong stock performance leading up 
to a campaign, I use FactSet to measure prior year stock return for each activist target in 
the sample. The one-year-period observed uses an unaffected stock price (one week 
before the action date or filing date provided by SharkWatch) as its end date to calculate 
total price appreciation or depreciation. This metric aims to measure how appealing or 
unappealing activists’ director nominees may be after a period of poor or strong stock 
performance.  
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I predict that the prior year stock return variable will have a positive sign in the 
regression analyses due to voter sentiment that there is more cushion for improved 
governance tactics (i.e., introducing opposition-proposed external directors) when a 
corporation's share price is on the rise. However, I also would not be entirely surprised to 
see a slightly negative relationship. Activist intervention in a corporation after a period of 
positive returns could give MF investors pause and lead them to side with management’s 
proposed directors.  
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RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
Throughout this section, my analyses have a multi-faceted goal: identify which 
fund families were the most proactive in supporting opposition-proposed directors over 
my specified date range and determine which variables were influential in these votes. I 
first use a number of summary statistics to identify surface-level tendencies, and then I 
perform multivariate regression analyses on voting support proportions using the 
variables detailed in my methodology section as regressors. In the subsections to follow, I 
detail my findings in a number of tables and figures and discuss the conclusions I came to 
upon analyzing the statistics therein.  
After interpreting my regressions and developing a formula that considers what I 
deem the most important metrics and variables, I conclude that Deutsche Asset 
Management, BlackRock, Prudential, AXA Equitable and New York Life were the most 
proactive in supporting opposition-sponsored directors in recent years. Given that 
BlackRock is one of the largest and most recognized names in the industry, it is relevant 
to know that some industry leaders are paying close attention to activist demands and 
proposals. On the opposing side, funds managed by JP Morgan Asset Management, 
Oppenheimer Funds, and Invesco all showed a strong bias toward management-
sponsored directors. Through identifying these fund families, I also conclude that 
variables like ISS support and dissident track record (SW50) negatively affect 
opposition-sponsored director support, while stronger takeover defenses (Bullet Proof 
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rating) and prior year stock price drive increases in the support of activists’ director 
nominees. One of my most intriguing high-level findings was that there is an enormous 
amount of variation in support percentages across fund families in the dataset, which 
leads me to believe that exploration of these variables across a larger sample would be a 
productive way to continue this research. 
Very early on in the data exploration phase, it became evident that fund families 
often choose not to vote on director proposals in activist contexts. This may be because 
ISS regularly recommended that families "do not vote" on many of the proposals in my 
sample. Because a lack of a vote leaves uncertainty as to how an institution views a 
proposal or activism in general, all that is left to analyze are the “for,” “against,” and 
“withhold” votes cast by mutual funds in the sample's proxy fights. 
 
Summary Statistics 
 The statistics to follow span the range of the entire dataset (Q3 2011 to Q2 2016). 
Where necessary, units are clarified in parentheses. The last section of statistics in Table 
5 breaks out important mean values for many of the metrics used to conduct regression 
analyses (see methodology section for further detail).  
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Table 5 
 
An average of 6.3% dissident ownership explains that the proposals being brought 
to proxy votes were all made by significantly large shareholders. A simple calculation of 
average ownership ´ average market capitalization reveals that the average monetary 
position of activists in the sample was about $360 million. Further, these contests were 
markedly costly to target corporations, especially considering the aforementioned fact 
that over 70% of proposals in the sample were for director nominations.  
Averages of the two proprietary SharkRepellent metrics—SW50 membership and 
Bullet Proof Rating—are also helpful in contextualizing the nature of the activists in the 
sample and corporation’s readiness to defend against them. Seventeen of the 21 
campaigns observed involve an SW50 member, and a sample average Bullet Proof 
Rating of 2.0 out of 10 suggests that the target corporations were not seasoned activism 
defense veterans. While I cannot conclude that all of these variables play significant roles 
in influencing voters, they do all provide helpful context on the campaigns in my sample. 
Page 1
Voting & Other Statistics — Entire Sample
Votes with Management 67.6%
ISS Recommends Vote "For"1 43.4%
Votes For:
Management Proposal 88.7%
Opposition Proposal 76.0%
Management vs. Opposition Support Deficit 12.7%
Selected Campaign Sample Averages
Dissident Ownership (at announcement) 6.3%
Market Capitalization (at announcement, $mm) 5,747.4
Estimated Fight Costs to Corporation ($mm) $5.2
Activist is in SharkWatch 50 (% of campaigns) 81%
Bullet Proof Rating (1-10) 2.0
Note:
1. Other ISS recommendations are "Against," "Withhold," and "Do Not Vote"
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One significant observation I can make from the statistics presented in Table 4 
(see page 24) is that there are not nearly as many opposition-sponsored director nominees 
as management-sponsored nominees in the sample. This fact means that there are fewer 
opportunities to observe fund families’ opposition voting behavior on a nominal basis, 
Despite the imbalance of opportunities, some fund families show disproportionate vote 
participation (comparing the number of opposition directors voted on with the total 
number of director proposals voted on). Table 6 depicts the top five and bottom five fund 
families by a measure of opposition proposal vote proportion.  
 
Table 6 
 
 
It is possible that some fund families indicate a lower participation percentage for 
opposition proposals because their votes in the sample were concentrated on a handful of 
the activist engagements that may have contained fewer opposition director nominee 
proposals. This possibility becomes less probable when we see that Vanguard, the largest 
MF manager in the United States by AUM, cast only 5.2% of its total votes on 
opposition-sponsored director proposals (as compared to 94.8% on management-
U.S. MF Rank 
by AUM Family Name
# Director 
Nominees Voted On
Opposition 
Nominees Voted 
On / Total
71 Virtus Investment Advisers, Inc 41 51.2%
28 Principal Management Corporation 83 50.6%
33 Janus Capital Management LLC 76 48.7%
12 Federated Equity Management Company of Pennsylvania 119 47.1%
52 Nuveen Asset Management 102 44.1%
55 Pacific Life Fund Advisors 192 20.3%
4 JPMorgan Asset Management, Inc. (US) 107 17.8%
24 Legg Mason Capital Management, Inc. 109 14.7%
15 OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 42 14.3%
1 Vanguard Group, Inc. 174 5.2%
Top 5
Bottom 5
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sponsored nominee proposals). From this high-level data, I tentatively conclude that 
companies with low opposition proportions relative to total votes in proxy fights prefer to 
avoid activist confrontation and simply not vote.  
In Table 7, I draw on the affirmative vote differential metric and highlight various 
fund families and their levels of proposal-driven affirmative vote bias. The table shows 
the top ten and bottom ten fund families when sorted greatest to least by this bias metric. 
Also included in Table 7 are the corresponding ISS adherence differentials and bias 
figures for each of the 20 fund families displayed. 
 
Table 7 
 
 
U.S. MF Rank 
by AUM Family Name
Affirmative 
Vote 
Differential
Proposal-Driven 
Affirmative 
Vote Bias
ISS Adherence 
Differential
Proposal-Driven 
ISS 
Adherence Bias
30 American Century Investment Management 38.5% 62.5% (7.7%) (7.7%)
73 Allianz Global Investors 38.5% 62.5% 24.2% 32.0%
15 OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 33.3% 50.0% (50.0%) (50.0%)
1 Vanguard Group, Inc. 30.9% 46.4% 27.3% 69.2%
52 Nuveen Asset Management 27.1% 38.2% (16.0%) (16.3%)
26 SEI Investments Management Corporation 21.9% 34.2% (26.7%) (27.1%)
16 INVESCO Institutional 24.8% 33.9% 17.0% 22.2%
10 Dimensional Fund Advisors, Inc. 24.7% 33.7% (9.5%) (11.0%)
4 JPMorgan Asset Management, Inc. (US) 22.9% 31.1% (26.8%) (42.1%)
45 AIG SunAmerica Asset Management Corp. 21.0% 30.5% (11.6%) (11.7%)
42 New York Life Investment Management 13.8% 16.2% 4.3% 5.2%
11 Goldman Sachs Asset Management 11.5% 15.3% 9.0% 11.8%
35 AXA Equitable Funds Management Group 12.9% 15.0% 41.1% 97.2%
71 Virtus Investment Advisers, Inc 9.3% 10.8% (4.8%) (4.8%)
19 Massachusetts Financial Services Company 8.6% 10.7% 14.3% 21.7%
6 BlackRock Advisors 8.1% 9.5% 18.1% 38.6%
5 T. Rowe Price 7.3% 9.3% (13.7%) (16.2%)
8 TIAA-CREF Asset Management 0.0% 0.0% 66.7% -
14 Prudential Financial (3.0%) (3.5%) 7.6% 17.9%
47 Deutsche Asset Management (9.7%) (11.2%) (16.7%) (16.7%)
Top 10 
(biased toward 
mgmt.)
Bottom 10 
(biased toward 
mgmt.)
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Data in Table 7 do not convey any obvious correlation between a fund family’s decisions 
to adhere to ISS recommendations and to vote for a management proposal with more 
frequency than an opposition proposal. It also seems that MF manager size (looking at 
AUM rankings) is not correlated with affirmative vote bias. Perhaps the most notable 
takeaway from the above metrics is that three of the top ten fund families by AUM are in 
the bottom ten group for affirmative vote bias.  Families such as BlackRock, T. Rowe 
Price, and TIAA-CREF exhibit noticeably low levels of affirmative vote bias, with some 
families actually showing a slight bias toward opposition proposals (e.g., Prudential 
Financial, -3.5% bias). For added context, Figure 3 shows the top ten fund families by 
AUM and their corresponding affirmative vote biases. 
 
 
 
Figure 3  Affirmative vote totals for management and opposition director nominees for the top ten fund 
families in the sample by AUM. (Management support proportion divided by opposition support proportion) 
minus 1 yields the "Proposal-Driven Affirmative Vote Bias." 
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Regression Analyses 
Once I began to get a picture of how fund families voted on the surface level, I 
performed several regression analyses with proposal support percentage (% votes cast 
“for”) as the dependent variable and the metrics discussed in my methodology section as 
independent variables. First, I ran a regression for all proposals in the sample with seven 
independent variables to determine which variables were statistically significant.16 I 
found that the ISS support, prior year stock price return, and dissident in SharkWatch 50 
variables were significant in the all proposals regression (at 5%, 5%, and 10%, 
respectively. I subsequently ran a regression with these three variables, Bullet Proof 
rating, and director and officer ownership for the opposition director proposals subset. 
This regression found that all variables were significant at 5% or below except for 
director and officer ownership (significant at 10%). Table 8 provides a summary of the 
independent variables’ coefficients, t-statistics, and levels of significance. 
                                            
16 Variables tested in the all proposals regression were: average dissident ownership %, ISS supports 
director %, dissident in SharkWatch 50, target’s Bullet Proof rating, average director & officer ownership 
%, market capitalization at announcement, and prior year stock price return 
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Table 8 
 
 
This first regression shows that when only opposition proposals are considered, ISS 
support and SharkWatch 50 membership negatively affect opposition-sponsored director 
support. These results are surprising due to the fact that, as previously discussed, many 
institutional investors follow ISS voting recommendations. I discuss these findings 
further in conjunction with the top-35 by AUM fund family regression analysis. Average 
director and officer ownership, it appears, may have a profound effect on whether a fund 
family chooses to vote for an opposition proposal due to its coefficient of 2.583 (p-value 
of .082).   
I ran a third regression for opposition proposals that included only top-35 AUM 
fund families, which resulted in three out of five variables being significant at 1%. While 
this model was still significant and the variables accounted for more of the overall 
variability in opposition proposal support (r square of .713), the smaller sample size of 23 
All Opposition Director Proposals
Dependent Variable = proposal support (%) R Square = 0.556 n=34
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
ISS Supports Proposal % -0.647 *** -3.256
Dissident in SharkWatch 50 -0.517 *** -4.653
Target's Bullet Proof Rating (1-10) 0.117 *** 4.158
Average Director & Officer Ownership % 2.583 * 1.804
Stock Price Return 0.311 ** 2.301
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
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fund families does not make for as robust of an analysis. Table 9 details the same 
statistics as the initial opposition director proposals regression. 
 
 
Table 9 
 
 
The reduced sample regression largely confirms the independent variable relationships 
with opposition director nominees established in the prior regression. Though at a lower 
significance level, the top-35 fund family model shows that stock price return has a 
positive influence on families’ opposition director support proportion. Notably, average 
director and officer ownership, the variable with the highest absolute coefficient in the all 
opposition director proposals regression, became insignificant when the sample was 
narrowed.  
 Two variables that exhibit somewhat strong negative influence on the dependent 
variable are “ISS Supports Proposal %” and “Dissident in SharkWatch 50.” Negative 
Opposition Director Proposals—Top 35 U.S. Fund Families by AUM
Dependent Variable = proposal support (%) R Square = 0.713 n=23
Variable Coefficient t-statistic
ISS Supports Proposal % -0.934 *** -4.618
Dissident in SharkWatch 50 -0.612 *** -5.516
Target's Bullet Proof Rating (1-10) 0.124 *** 4.651
Stock Price Return 0.277 * 2.021
* significant at 10%  ** significant at 5%  *** significant at 1%
Note:
1. When narrowing the sample to Top 35 MFs by AUM, the Average Director & Officer Ownership % 
variable was no longer significant
  42 
relationships here, especially of this magnitude, are surprising and appear 
counterintuitive.  
A dissident being in the SharkWatch 50 entails it is a prominent activist based on 
a number of qualitative and quantitative factors (see Methodology section), so one would 
predict that nominees proposed by these supposedly experienced activists would be more 
popular among voters. Nevertheless, this variable is driven by a proprietary and partially 
subjective classification which may not have a meaningful impact on fund families voting 
behavior. Another possibility is that activists with a long track record may, in fact, be 
more intimidating to fund families from a governance-seeking perspective. In this case, 
my results are less counterintuitive.  
 The quandary of the negative coefficient for ISS support has a potentially more 
straightforward explanation. Table 4 shows that in my sample of all director proposals, 
ISS recommended “for” votes on less than 50% of all occasions.17 Such a low support 
statistic for the entire sample may suggest that ISS recommendations in director elections 
during activist engagements are less influential than in other proposal types. However, 
my regressions’ strong negative coefficients do not suggest this.  
While a number of external factors could be in play here, one possible explanation 
can be found in prior research on mutual fund voting and business ties. Ashraf, Jayarman, 
and Ryan (2016) explain, “Our analysis of [votes cast by fund families with and without 
business ties] documents a strong relationship between the likelihood that a fund family 
                                            
17 Any ISS recommendation besides “for”—in other words, “against,” “do not vote,” and “withhold”—was 
grouped into one pool, so the denominator for the ISS support metric calculation is the sum of all these 
recommendation totals (and not just “for” + “against”) 
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votes against shareholder proposals on compensation and pension-related business 
ties…Such a result is prevalent only when ISS recommends passage of a proposal” (p. 
568). This determination that voting against ISS recommendations is prevalent in one 
context (when pension-related business ties exist) leads me to believe that my 
regression’s results are not as surprising as many would initially expect. To be sure, there 
are many other possible explanations for the negative influence of ISS support manifested 
by my analysis.  
To further explore which factors account for the most variability in proposal support 
percentage, I create and observe box and whisker plots (see Appendix D) for the 
following variables: 
• Opposition Support % 
• ISS Supports Proposal %  
• Dissident in SharkWatch 50    
• Average Dissident Ownership %  
• Average Director & Officer Ownership %  
• Stock Price Return 
These plots showed me that most of the variables I measure are fairly evenly distributed, 
and many of them have concentrated interquartile ranges. Overall ranges are large for 
many of the variables, so the main conclusion I draw from the charts is that outliers in 
some of the independent variable sets may have skewed my analyses in one way or 
another. Stock price return and dissident ownership are two variables with wide 
expansive ranges that I pay close attention to—and consider given little to no weight to—
when creating my ranking formula below. 
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 Once I narrowed my sample to the largest organizations in the mutual fund 
industry and established which variables were most influential in the voting process, I 
returned to my initial fund family-level summary statistics to ascertain which investors 
were most proactive voting in either direction. After controlling for influential variables, I 
identified which fund families are most likely to support and which are most likely to 
oppose activist proposals.  
I created a formula that weighs the quartiles of four metrics observed throughout 
my analysis. For all quartile indexing, the highest values are “top quartile” values with 
the exception of proposal-driven affirmative vote bias. For that metric, the lowest values 
indicate less bias toward management proposals and thus are top quartile values. The 
equation is detailed below. The lower the quartile-weighted score, the more supportive of 
activists the fund family is: 
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒	𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝑒𝑑	𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 								2.00 ∗ 𝑞(𝑜𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡	%) 					+2.50 ∗ 𝑓𝑙𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑑	𝑞(𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑙	𝑑𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑛	𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒	𝑣𝑜𝑡𝑒	𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠) 					+1.75 ∗ 𝑞(𝑆𝑊50	𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒	𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) 					+1.00 ∗ 𝑞(𝑏𝑢𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑡	𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑜𝑓	𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔	𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) 					+1.25 ∗ 𝑞(𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘	𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒	𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛)		
 
Slightly heavier weights were given to opposition support and affirmative vote bias. For 
the former metric, this was done because this is a straightforward measure of activist 
support. Affirmative vote bias is perhaps the best measure of fund family voting because 
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a low or negative metric in this category reflects a holistic, unbiased voting behavior 
process. Accordingly, this metric was given the most significant weight.18  
The Bullet Proof rating was considered in this formula whereas others were not 
because regression analysis discussed previously suggests that a higher Bullet Proof 
Rating results in higher activist support. Thus, voting with activists when this rating is 
lower conveys fund family proactivity. Tables 10 and 11 reveal my conclusions for which 
fund families were the most supportive (“friends”) and least supportive (“foes”) of 
activists over my study’s date range.  
 
Table 10 
 
 
                                            
18 The quartiles for affirmative vote bias were flipped so that a low or negative value for this variable is 
rewarded, while a high figure (indicating significant director proposal source bias) is penalized. 
Activist Friends — Top Opposition-Supporting Fund Families 
Quartile Indexing
U.S. MF Rank 
by AUM Family Name
Opposition Support 
Percentage
Proposal-Driven 
Affirmative Vote Bias1
SharkWatch 50 Activist 
Prevalence
Average Bullet Proof 
Rating
Prior Year Stock Price 
Return
47 Deutsche Asset Management 1 4 1 1 1
6 BlackRock 1 4 2 1 1
14 Prudential Financial 1 4 1 4 1
35 AXA Equitable 1 4 2 1 2
42 New York Life 1 3 1 1 3
Note:
1. A top-quartile proposal-driven affirmative vote bias indicates strong bias; recall that quartiles for this variable were flipped to calculate friends and foes
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Table 11 
 
  
Activist Foes  — Top Opposition-Opposing Fund Families 
Quartile Indexing
U.S. MF Rank 
by AUM Family Name
Opposition Support 
Percentage
Proposal-Driven 
Affirmative Vote Bias1
SharkWatch 50 Activist 
Prevalence
Average Bullet Proof 
Rating
Prior Year Stock Price 
Return
15 Oppenheimer Funds 4 1 4 1 4
30 American Century 4 1 3 3 3
26 SEI Investments 4 1 2 4 3
16 Invesco 3 1 4 4 1
4 JPMorgan Asset Management 3 1 2 4 4
Note:
1. A top-quartile proposal-driven affirmative vote bias indicates strong bias; recall that quartiles for this variable were flipped to calculate friends and foes
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OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER EXPLORATION 
 
A multitude of possibilities exists in the realm of analyzing the voting behavior of 
fund families as I have done here. Given the opportunity to research and analyze this data 
in such a specific context further, there are a number of different avenues I would enjoy 
exploring. From my conclusions in this study, retail shareholders and institutional 
investors alike can begin to think about using similar voting behavior analysis to choose 
the stewards of their capital. Mutual fund companies who do not exhibit bias related to 
unrelated factors in the high-stakes context of proxy fights may be more attractive to 
shareholders who desire an active mindset even in a passive or low-maintenance 
investment strategy.  
 
Other Potential Methodologies 
Continuing my trend analysis while testing a few different methodologies could 
yield different results, as there are numerous ways to count and interpret votes. There is a 
significant qualitative element to voting that I wish had somehow revealed itself 
quantitatively. I think that this may be possible once a few different ways of calculating 
opposition support are attempted. While performing robustness checks on my 
methodology, I contemplated several ways to treat the data.  
Consider first the method I used in my research—call it Method A. Put simply, 
when an opposition slate of directors is chosen by the fund family, the opposition support 
metric is calculated as the number of votes cast in favor of opposition nominees divided 
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by the total number of votes cast on opposition nominee proposals. Method A does not 
“penalize” mutual fund voters for not choosing opposition slates, rather, it compares the 
number of votes cast in favor of the opposition-sponsored directors to those cast against 
or withheld. This calculation provides an accurate picture of each fund family’s voting 
tendencies because it measures how they voted when presented with each director 
nominee on the slate they choose.  
Another possibility is Method B. Logically, in any given proxy fight where the 
opposition proposes directors, there are a specific number of possible opposition-
sponsored directors that a fund family can vote for. Whether the family actually chooses 
to vote for any of them depends on whether they elect the management or opposition 
slate.19 Using this approach, if there are x number of opposition nominees available to 
vote for in a proxy vote, the family’s opposition support metric is calculated as the 
number of votes cast for opposition directors divided by x. With Method B, voting for the 
management slate of directors in a given proxy vote constitutes 0% opposition support. 
Alternatively, consider Method C. Essentially a more simplified version of 
Method B, another way to calculate opposition support is to observe whether a fund 
family voted for greater than 0 opposition nominees in a proxy fight. With this method, 
electing to vote for an opposition slate (even if all opposition nominees are not 
individually supported with) would yield a supportive outcome in the analysis (a 1). 
Conversely, choosing the management slate would constitute a lack of support (a 0). This 
                                            
19 Recall that the opposition slate is rarely filled with opposition nominees and thus can contain a mix of 
opposition- and management-proposed directors. 
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is a binary way of counting vote behavior and would be more difficult to use to draw 
conclusions without a much larger dataset. Perhaps a voting behavior analysis in proxy 
fights beginning in 2003 at the advent of the N-PX requirement and concluding with the 
most recent full year of vote record data would be of sufficient size (a greater number of 
proxy fights that “went the distance” to measure) to use this binary approach. 
These are just a few ways to treat a sample that can be subjected to many 
methodologies. While no one way is necessarily correct, it would be interesting to see if 
the results using Method A or B are different or less surprising than the conclusions at 
which I arrived.  
 
Real World Implications 
Unrelated to the treatment of data in this sample are the implications of real-world 
circumstances and trials. After my analysis, many questions remain. Could new financial 
regulation affect voting behavior? Is there cost savings potential for avoiding activism 
against corporations with significant ownership by families like JPMorgan and Invesco? 
Or, should activists target corporations that fund families like BlackRock and Prudential 
hold? Future research can build on the existing literature and hopefully consider my 
study’s findings to help structure new questions.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A 
Variable Quartile Results — All Fund Families in the Sample1 
 
 
 
Quartile Indexing
U.S. MF Rank 
by AUM Family Name
Opposition Support 
Percentage
Proposal-Driven 
Affirmative Vote Bias2
SharkWatch 50 
Activist Prevalence
Average Bullet Proof 
Rating
Prior Year Stock Price 
Return
1 Vanguard Group, Inc. 4 1 1 4 1
2 Fidelity 2 2 3 3 2
4 JPMorgan Asset Management, Inc. (US) 3 1 2 4 4
5 T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc. (MD) 2 4 1 3 2
6 BlackRock Advisors, Inc. 1 4 2 1 1
8 TIAA-CREF Asset Management LLC 1 4 4 4 4
10 Dimensional Fund Advisors, Inc. 3 1 3 3 3
11 Goldman Sachs Asset Management LP (US) 3 4 4 2 4
12 Federated Equity Management Company of Pennsylvania 3 2 1 2 1
14 Prudential Financial 1 4 1 4 1
15 OppenheimerFunds, Inc. 4 1 4 1 4
16 INVESCO Institutional (N.A.), Inc. 3 1 4 4 1
18 Columbia Management Advisors, Inc. 1 3 3 1 3
19 Massachusetts Financial Services Company 2 4 4 2 2
20 Wells Fargo Funds Management, LLC 4 2 2 3 2
23 Morgan Stanley Investment Management Inc. 2 3 4 1 4
24 Legg Mason Capital Management, Inc. 2 3 1 4 1
25 Northern Trust Global Investments 2 3 4 1 3
26 SEI Investments Management Corporation 4 1 2 4 3
28 Principal Management Corporation 1 3 2 1 2
30 American Century Investment Management, Inc. 4 1 3 3 3
33 Janus Capital Management LLC 2 3 4 2 3
35 AXA Equitable Funds Management Group 1 4 2 1 2
40 Voya Investment Management, LLC 3 2 3 3 2
42 New York Life Investment Management LLC 1 3 1 1 3
45 AIG SunAmerica Asset Management Corp. 4 2 3 3 3
47 Deutsche Asset Management 1 4 1 1 1
51 USAA Investment Management Company 3 3 1 3 1
52 Nuveen Asset Management 4 1 2 2 4
55 Pacific Life Fund Advisors 3 2 2 2 1
59 Nationwide Fund Advisors 2 2 2 2 4
61 Thrivent Investment Management, Inc. 4 2 3 4 4
71 Virtus Investment Advisers, Inc 1 4 1 1 2
73 Allianz Global Investors Fund Management 4 1 4 4 4
Notes:
1. Excludes fund families who voted on fewer than 5 opposition-sponsored director proposals in the sample (ex: Capital Research and Management Company, 3rd by AUM ranking)
2. A top-quartile proposal-driven affirmative vote bias indicates strong bias; recall that quartiles for this variable were flipped to calculate friends and foes
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Appendix B 
Growing Index Fund Prevalence—Selected Figures from 2017 ICI Factbook 
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Activist Campaigns & Characteristics (cont’d.) 
 
SW
50
Bu
lle
t P
ro
of
Co
m
pa
ny
 N
am
e
In
du
st
ry
En
d 
Da
te
Gl
as
s L
ew
is 
Su
pp
or
ts
IS
S 
Su
pp
or
ts
M
ee
tin
g 
Da
te
M
em
be
r
Ra
tin
g
Re
tu
rn
Fo
re
st
 La
bo
ra
to
rie
s, 
In
c.
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s:
 M
aj
or
8/
18
/1
1
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
8/
18
/1
1
Ye
s
1.
25
45
.2
%
Cr
ac
ke
r B
ar
re
l O
ld
 C
ou
nt
ry
 S
to
re
, In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
12
/2
0/
11
Di
ss
id
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
12
/2
0/
11
Ye
s
2.
25
(8
.3
%
)
O
sh
ko
sh
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
M
ot
or
 V
eh
icl
es
1/
27
/1
2
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Sp
lit
1/
27
/1
2
Ye
s
0.
75
(1
8.
4%
)
AO
L I
nc
.
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
 S
er
vic
es
6/
14
/1
2
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
6/
14
/1
2
Ye
s
1.
25
(4
7.
0%
)
Fo
re
st
 La
bo
ra
to
rie
s, 
In
c.
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s:
 M
aj
or
8/
15
/1
2
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Sp
lit
8/
15
/1
2
Ye
s
1.
25
(5
.8
%
)
Cr
ac
ke
r B
ar
re
l O
ld
 C
ou
nt
ry
 S
to
re
, In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
11
/1
5/
12
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
11
/1
5/
12
Ye
s
5.
25
16
.7
%
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
am
e 
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
Co
m
pu
te
r P
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
Ha
rd
w
ar
e
3/
5/
13
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
3/
5/
13
No
0.
5
53
.0
%
St
illw
at
er
 M
in
in
g 
Co
m
pa
ny
O
th
er
 M
et
al
s/
M
in
er
al
s
5/
2/
13
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
5/
2/
13
Ye
s
1.
25
13
.8
%
Al
er
e,
 In
c.
Ph
ar
m
ac
eu
tic
al
s:
 O
th
er
8/
7/
13
Di
ss
id
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
8/
7/
13
No
2.
5
12
.7
%
Cr
ac
ke
r B
ar
re
l O
ld
 C
ou
nt
ry
 S
to
re
, In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
11
/1
3/
13
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
11
/1
3/
13
Ye
s
5.
25
23
.1
%
Se
ns
ie
nt
 T
ec
hn
ol
og
ie
s C
or
po
ra
tio
n
Fo
od
: S
pe
cia
lty
/C
an
dy
4/
24
/1
4
M
an
ag
em
en
t
-
4/
24
/1
4
Ye
s
1
29
.9
%
Te
le
ph
on
e 
an
d 
Da
ta
 S
ys
te
m
s, 
In
c.
W
ire
le
ss
 T
el
ec
om
m
un
ica
tio
ns
5/
22
/1
4
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
5/
22
/1
4
Ye
s
1.
25
22
.3
%
Cl
iff
s N
at
ur
al
 R
es
ou
rc
es
 In
c.
St
ee
l
7/
29
/1
4
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
7/
29
/1
4
No
1.
25
(4
2.
8%
)
Bo
b 
Ev
an
s F
ar
m
s, 
In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
8/
20
/1
4
Di
ss
id
en
t
Sp
lit
8/
20
/1
4
Ye
s
1.
25
37
.3
%
CO
NM
ED
 C
or
po
ra
tio
n
M
ed
ica
l S
pe
cia
lti
es
9/
10
/1
4
Di
ss
id
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
9/
10
/1
4
Ye
s
1.
75
33
.2
%
Da
rd
en
 R
es
ta
ur
an
ts
, In
c.
Re
st
au
ra
nt
s
10
/1
0/
14
Di
ss
id
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
10
/1
0/
14
Ye
s
5.
5
(2
.1
%
)
E.
 I. 
du
 P
on
t d
e 
Ne
m
ou
rs
 a
nd
 C
om
pa
ny
Ch
em
ica
ls:
 S
pe
cia
lty
5/
13
/1
5
M
an
ag
em
en
t
Sp
lit
5/
13
/1
5
Ye
s
1.
25
18
.3
%
Ro
vi 
Co
rp
or
at
io
n
In
te
rn
et
 S
of
tw
ar
e/
Se
rv
ice
s
5/
13
/1
5
Di
ss
id
en
t
Di
ss
id
en
t
5/
13
/1
5
Ye
s
1.
5
(9
.5
%
)
Te
le
ph
on
e 
an
d 
Da
ta
 S
ys
te
m
s, 
In
c.
Sp
ec
ia
lty
 T
el
ec
om
m
un
ica
tio
ns
5/
21
/1
5
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
5/
21
/1
5
Ye
s
1.
25
5.
8%
Sh
ut
te
rfl
y, 
In
c.
M
isc
el
la
ne
ou
s C
om
m
er
cia
l S
er
vic
es
6/
12
/1
5
Sp
lit
Di
ss
id
en
t
6/
12
/1
5
No
4.
75
(2
4.
0%
)
Be
nc
hm
ar
k E
le
ct
ro
ni
cs
, In
c.
El
ec
tro
ni
c C
om
po
ne
nt
s
5/
11
/1
6
M
an
ag
em
en
t
M
an
ag
em
en
t
5/
11
/1
6
Ye
s
0.
75
(5
.2
%
)
Av
er
ag
e 
Pr
io
r Y
ea
r R
et
ur
n
7.
1%
  54 
Appendix D 
Yearly Director Voting Trends (Q3 2011 to Q2 2016) 
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Appendix E-1 
Box Plots of Selected Metrics 
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Appendix E-2 
Box Plots of Selected Metrics (cont’d.) 
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